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Richard R. Weiner 
 
DISCOURSE AND ARGUMENT 
IN INSTITUTING THE GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL LAW 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Social Rights were initially understood as the rights of a pluralism of instituted 
associations; and transformed to the rights of distributive justice associated with the 
politics of access to welfare state corporatism.  More recently, they have been 
understood as the rights of multicultural difference; and now as the rights to               
complexity (Zolo), and rights to consideration of polycontextural effect vis-à- vis 
transnational corporations (Teubner).  Social rights are no longer subject positions 
versus political bodies, but also against social institutions, in particular, vis-à-vis 
centers of economic power. 
 
This article studies the emergence of social rights and social law as an ontology of 
institutional facts by which actors can be induced to share standards for self 
governance, and be involved in public reasoning.  Institutional space is understood as 
never being closed; and as always open for argumentation, the novelty and creativity 
of actors.  Historical institutionalist approaches can be tweaked into a focus on the 
promise of signifiers that have not yet delivered on their promise of order.  Emergent 
institutions/unfolding normativity are understood as constituted not by mythic 
substance (Schmitt) but by warranted assertions (argument) by which we participate 
in a promising game of institutional facticity (Habermas).   
 
The architect Daniel Libeskind has written a noted lecture, “Traces of the Unborn.”  
We might add, “Traces of the Stillborn.”  There is a tendency in historical 
institutionalism (HI) to concentrate on the retrieval of traces of paths taken rather than 
(1) to consider the processes involved in the selection of paths; and (2) to reflect upon 
the conditions of institutional emergence and sedimentation of paths, whether taken or 
untaken.  Contrary to the path-dependency obsessed historical institutionalism of a 
Paul Pierson, this article stresses the significance of historical case studies of 
institutional emergence in the earlier 20
th
 century and their diremptive role within an 
unfolding genealogy of knowledge--what Foucault referred to as “effective 
history/critical history.”  A more critically oriented historical institutionalism journeys 
into the interior of institutions beyond “interestedness” toward “committedness,” 
toward the endogenous emergence of the argumentative logic of a mode of 
legitimation. 
 
The traces of the not yet or not fully born reveal the case of the law creating capacity 
of autonomous collective associations.  They shape their own autonomous domains 
heteronomously, institutionalizing collective rationalities - -institutionally separated, 
but recursively and complementarily connected to each other within a network.  Such 
institutional emergence in practice reflects liberalism‟s inability to grasp the 
constitutive quality of collective life first provoked at the beginning of the 20
th
 
century by organized/monopoly capital, and today under the compression of 
globalized capital.  How does liberalism cope with pluralism?  How does it do so 
beyond the legacy of premodern guild and collegial institutional forms? 
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I.  Institutional Emergence:   
    The Institutionalizing Discourse of the Governance of Social Law 
 
Post-liberal conceptions of governmentality, jurisprudence and institutional justice 
emerged capable of providing a new substantive institutional foundation for the new 
autonomous collective associations that transcended and surpassed the classical 
liberal values privileging private property.  These institutional conceptions 
supplemented traditional liberal ones, but also built in democratizing institutional 
practices within the governance autonomous collective associations. Beyond private 
law welfare jurisprudence, emerged the governance of social law in the 
experimentation of the Weimar Republic.
1
 
 
Conventional American and British political science have long taught us of the viral 
shades represented in Weimar Republic efforts at democracy.  Any remnants of 
ghosts of Weimar needed to be exorcised in the building of modern industrial 
democracy.  However, in the past years, English-speaking audiences have been 
reawakened to those Weimar efforts by histories of political and legal thoughts of the 
likes of Franz Neumann and Hermann Heller.  These have been provided by Bill 
Scheuerman (1994), David Dyzenhaus (1997) and Peter Caldwell (1997).  These 
historical retrievals suggest an immanent tradition of social law and social rights 
associated with the struggle to develop labor law, complementary institutions of 
                                               
1
 This trace of the stillborn was generated out of the violent class struggles of mutinous sailors‟ councils outside Kiel in 1918 as 
well as workers‟ councils springing up in Berlin.  Out of these violent struggles, the jurist Hugo Preuss inserted key clauses on 
social rights, works councils.  Labor law and self-constituting social law into the Weimar Republic Constitution.  At the end of 
October 1918, sensing the First World War was lost, sailors of the German High Sea Fleet refused to obey orders to sail against 
the British Fleet.  Their revolutionary insurbordination caught fire.  By 4 November, rioting sailors took control of Kiel and 
together with dockers formed an Workers‟ and Soldiers‟ Council with revolutionary powers.  By 7 November, the whole fleet 
joined the Council Movement.  On the 10
th
 of November 1918 - - a day after the Kaiser‟s abdication and the end of imperial rule, 
a day before the Armistice - - the Berlin Workers‟ and Soldiers‟ Council meeting in the Busch Circus and acting as the 
representatives of all revolutionary workers and soldiers in the Reich, proclaimed a republican system of government.  
Parliamentary socialist leaders like Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Schneidemann forestalled a proclamation of either a “socialist 
republic” or a “republic of councils.”  An Action Committee of the Workers‟ and Soldiers‟ Council was named to keep watch 
over the republican government.  Five days later, Hugo Stinnes, leader of the employers‟ trade association, and Carl Legien, 
leader of the trade union confederation agreed to establish a “collectivist” system of labor-management arbitration committees, in 
which trade unions would be given full recognition.  The agreement was one of many seen as treaties of the organized versus 
Bolshevism, against a movement of workers‟ councils (Rate) that challenged employer prerogative and sought a democratic 
restructuring of capitalism starting from the workplace, and extending throughout the society.  It was the time when a social 
democratic government had the power to decree extensive nationalization, to socialize the mode of production.   
In the months following, the future of Germany to a large extent lay in the hands of these conflicting political and industrial 
organizations of the labor movement.  Starting in December, paramilitary groups in Berlin (e.g., The Free Corps) acting in behalf 
of the republican government engaged in bloody street battles with council supporters.  By January 1919, the extreme left-wing 
of the councils movement led the Spartacus rising for a Republic Council.  The revolt was crushed; Spartakist leaders Rosa 
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknicht were murdered by soldiers of the Free Corps.  As the workers‟ and soldiers‟ councils were being 
broken by the government and para-military troops acting on orders of the SPD coalition, focus shifted to factory councils and 
workers‟ chambers as transforming agents of workers‟ control.  Such organs were intended to make workers participant in the 
overseeing and planning of production.  An immanent tradition of social rights and social law was developed by what Claus Offe 
refers to as the “Lawyers Socialism” of Franz Neumann and Herman Heller.  This tradition and its advocates met the violent 
reaction of fascism.  Yet under the leadership of Neumann after 1945, the tradition was resurrected in the Bonn Republic 
Constitution.  Today, the tradition confronts the violence of hegemonic NeoLiberalism as the Schroder Coalition Government  
attempts to maintain social rights and social law amidst the demographic and fiscal pressures of 21
st
 century advanced industrial 
society that shapes the Berlin Republic. 
As Charles S. Maier notes, in Reshaping Bourgeois Europe (1975) the dawn of the Weimar Republic was not a socialist recasting 
of politico-economic forces, but a corporatist one.  Leaders of the traditional organizations of German labor, the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) and the trade unions, jealous of their newly won privileges, preferred to share their corporate influence 
with management representatives on parity committees to any sense of proletarian socializing power.  For six months in 1919 
these newly legitimated social partners sought to contain the unorthodox extra-parliamentary organization and methods of 
independent movement for direct workers‟ representation. 
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collective bargaining, and institutional guarantees regarding education, the family, 
health, work and codetermination.  In an epoch of NeoLiberal undermining of the 
institutions democratic movements constituted, should these Weimar efforts at 
creative constructivist and reflexive jurisprudence be exorcised?  Or rather adjured to 
as an act of  recommitment?  Can these Weimar traces of the commitment to the 
governance of social law and social rights be seen as traces of the not yet born, rather 
than of the stillborn? 
A genealogy of a German critical sociology of law is associated with the governance 
of social law.  Institutions position subjects ideationally.  And the institutionalizing of 
socially accountable private law as well as of social law and social rights occur within 
an institutional context of the rule of law.  Unlike private property rights, these new 
institutional practices were the result of ongoing negotiated processes.  This is what 
Gerhard Lehmbruch (1996, 1998) labels Negotiated Democracy 
(Verhandlungsdemokratie). 
 
Peter Caldwell notes, in his critique of Scheuerman, that the term Social Rechtsstaat 
(Sozialer Rechtsstaat) was a term used by Hermann Heller; and that it is best 
translated into English as the Rule of Social Law--or the Governance of Social Law--
rather than the “Social Rule of Law” State.  Further, beyond the inter-individual 
prerogative contract of laissez-faire liberalism, social law covers the collective 
constitutive contract based on multipartite consultations, bargaining and negotiation--
one which established a scheme of internal governance and autonomous moral/power 
resources, as well as a capacity for collective action. 
A focus on social law centers on the law creating capacity of autonomous collective 
associations.  They shape their own autonomous domains heteronomously, 
institutionalizing collective rationalities – institutionally separated, but recursively 
and complementarily connected to each other within a network.  Such institutional 
emergency in practice reflects liberalism‟s inability to grasp the constitutive quality of 
collective life first provoked at the beginning of the 20
th
 century by organized 
/monopoly capital, and today under the compression of globalized capital.   
This immanent institutional tradition is described somewhat by Oliver Gerstenberg 
in his recent 2001/2002 articles – “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy:  An Institutional 
Idea for Europe?” (co-authored with Charles Sabel) in C. Joerges and R. Dehousse, 
ed. Good Governance in Europe‟s Integrated Market.  Oxford University Press, 2002: 
289-341; and “Denationalization and the Very Idea of Democratic Constitutionalism:  
The Case of the European Community, “Ratio Juris, v. 14, n. 3 2001 (298-325).  
Gerstenberg in the latter (p. 320, fn. 21) cites Harold Laski and  Georges Gurvitch  
in the first half of the 20
th
 century as parallel “social law” sociology with a focus on 
law “emergent” from a pluralism of groups – a tradition recognized by Robert Dahl 
in his 1950-1990 work on the heteronomy of polyarchy, i. e., how a pluralism of 
groups coordinated its democratically created policies without falling prey to the 
Michelsian “iron law of oligarchy.”  The focus is on autonomous subsystems of 
governance, the decentralized multiplicity of spontaneous communication processes. 
 
The legal theorist Guenther Teubner - who has followed his social law predecessors 
at the London School of Economics, Otto Kahn Freund and Lord Wedderburn – 
reflects to such a non-oligarchic horizontal coordination as hetarchy.  This amounts to 
a pluralization of deliberative democracy within the autonomous law-making of a 
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decentered society – either within national borders, or in the case of the European 
Union across borders.  Significantly, a good deal of focus on the governance of social 
law and polyarchy traditions are in present day European Union studies.  Gerstenberg 
associated the governance of social law tradition with nineteenth century syndicalism 
(Proudhon, Blanc, Pelletier) and its more functionalist/corporatist reinterpretation in 
the twentieth century (Durkheim,Gurvitch, Lehmbruch).  He tries to move beyond this 
tradition, associating it with corporatist blockages and oligarchic short-circuiting of 
grass roots democratic experimentation. 
 
Alongside the social law tradition, Gerstenberg describes Teubner‟s 
polycontexturality approach as a systems theory approach to emergent “heterchical 
yet interconnected network-type linkage at the level of organizations and 
professions.”  This approach is seen as less functionalist and coordinated than 
corporatism, but Gerstenberg sees it as focusing more on a created circuitry of path-
dependency than on democratic path-shaping.  Teubner looks to a multiplicity of sub-
systemic subconstitutions, where private law is constitutionally constrained to take of 
its diverse social systemic context (hence polycontexturality).  Danieto Zolo (1992) 
adds a new level of social rights--the rights of complexity, the right to preserve 
practices/processes necessary for social systems to retain pattern maintenance.  These 
can be ethnic or linguistic, community or neighborhood based, craftsman or expert 
based. 
 
Teubner‟s approach to the pluralism of non-state regimes/non-state actors--having 
legal personality as legal subjects--is the successor to the earlier work of Gierke, 
Maitland and Laski on the legitimated autonomy of collegial formation.  This is the 
autonomy of non-state governance regime--regimes of state-less law-regulating and 
adjudicating wide areas of social activities.  This is the recognition of the emergence 
of autonomous subsystems of action typical for modern society.
2
 
 
Gerstenberg, along with Charles Sabel, eschew both corporatist functionalism and 
the autopoesis of sub-systems networking for the pragmatism of what they label grass 
roots democratic experimentation.  They focus – along with Archon Fung and 
Michael Dorf – on bootstrapping local autonomous deliberative democracy into a 
“horizontal” coordination and monitoring procedure that preserves an emphasis on 
citizen democratic deliberation both within the public sphere and private 
organizations. 
 
What all approaches share is a commitment to practices producing and reproducing 
more social egalitarianism, more participatory democracy within economic 
organizations and the workplace, and more of a pluralistic sensitivity to difference 
and the social byproducts and consequences of economic life.  And these 
commitments are understood as complementary to liberal notions of contract and 
property freedoms, but within a context of social choices and social responsibility. 
 
Franz Neumann (1900-1954) used the notion of “the governance of the rule of law” 
as the form to mediate the convergent genres of his two mentors, Otto von Gierke 
                                               
2 Gunther Teubner: “Hybrid Laws: Constitutionalizing Private Governance Networks” in Robert 
Kagen, M. Krygier and K. Winston, eds. Legality and Community (Berkeley, CA Public Policy Press, 
2002), pp. 311-331; and “Coincidentia Oppositorum: Networks and the Law Beyond Contract and 
Organization, The 2003/04 Storrs Lecture at Yale Law School. 
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and his London School of Economics (LSE) tutor Harold Laski. These are the 
Continental European traditions of Rechsstaat and Genossenschaft (fellowship 
associations) with the Anglo-Saxon tradition of “the rule of law.”  
 
The concept of a Social Rechtsstaat derives from the collective bargaining 
agreement‟s overcoming the prerogative contract associated with the master/servant 
relation and establishing a framework of internal self-governance herein alternative 
norms other than the liberal institution of property are understood as supportive of 
autonomy.  It is distinct from the Liberal Rechtsstaat of Kant and Weber and the 
Social State of state-administered social benefits we come to identify with the 
Keynesian Welfare State.  As we have backed into a NeoLiberal Rechtsstaat notion 
these past two decades, the path left open is to once more explore the Social 
Rechtsstaat:  a relation of state and civil society assuring autonomous institution of 
self-critical governance for diverse domains, reflexively responsible both within 
institutional spheres and between institutional spheres.  This is the theoretical mission 
of the present day London School of Economics (LSE) troika of Anthony Giddens, 
Gunther Teubner and Ulrich Beck, and follows in a less skeptical Michelsian manner 
the pioneering sociology of Philip Selznick and SM. Lipset. 
 
The governance of social law is understandably a precondition for the rule of 
democratic law.  Social rights assure individual enjoyment of primordial liberal rights.  
The Social Rechtsstaat is more self-binding than the interventionist Sozial Staat (or 
Wohlfahrtstaat).  And it is an institutional precondition for actualizing the Democratic 
Rechtsstaat in modern (or late modern) capitalism.  See Figure 1 below. 
 
A postliberal form such as the Social Rechtsstaat model is oriented to setting up 
institutions of moral discipline (i.e., governance) which can make us autonomous/self-
determining citizens enjoying basic rights.  They organize state/civil society relations 
into a coherent system of normative discourse of constitutive and regulative and 
institutionalizing practices.   
 
Rechtsstaat denotes law having rational and secular justification associated with a 
state or sovereign, as distinguished from premodern notions of traditional law, 
institutes of “organic” orders, or Natural Law.  Rechtsstaat is a continental European 
tradition and different from the Anglo-Saxon tradition of the “Rule of Law” 
associated with parliamentary supremacy and the genesis of law in the representatives 
of citizens.  Neumann used the term “governance of the rule of law” as the form 
mediating these two convergent genres.  And in his own attempts to deal with the 
pluralist implications of Gierke and his mentor at the London School of Economics 
Harold Laski, there is a fruitful tension in appreciating the extent to which phenomena 
called “state” or “sovereign” operates within a realm of legality, accountability, an 
independent judiciary, and a neutral and predictable set of procedures for applying the 
law.  Law cannot be normless nor cannot be formless.  The state is able through its 
sovereign to create and change the substance of the law.  At the same time, the 
societal sphere is protected against state intervention by (1) rights explicit or implicit 
constituted by human beings, (2) general norms and (3) the postulate of the 
“generality of law.”   
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           FIGURE 1 
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SOCIAL  
RECHTSSTAAT 
 
(public law 
moving toward  
social law) 
2 
 
SOCIAL WELFARE 
STATE/ 
SOZIAL STAAT 
 
(public law as a 
administrative law) 
3                                    
 
LIBERAL      
RECHTSSTAAT         
 
(private law  
with regulation) 
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NEOLIBERAL 
RECHTSSTAAT 
 
(private law 
without regulation) 
 
 
 
For Neumann, the governance of social law remained the unfinished project of the 
Rule of Law, the metaphysical functional equivalent of Natural Law, and the vital 
undercurrent in social democratic thinking latently present within the stronger statist 
and regulation-centured socialist mainstream.  It is historically more closely tied to 
the legal practices associated with syndicalism and the trade union movement than to 
the ideological or theoretical activities oriented toward political parties.  The 
generation of collective bargaining agreements, labor courts, and works communities 
are but a historical instance of the governance of social law.  Individual contract-
based law is challenged, and private property rights are adapted to “social ordering”  
- -  a constitutional ordering of the economy and society.  This is an institutionalizing 
discourse bent on actualizing the substance of social egalitarianism, and serving as 
corrective and alternative norms and forms vis-á-vis the liberal institutions of property 
are not the only ones than can support autonomy. 
 
The social law tradition and concept of Social Rechtsstaat captures best the approach 
of Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945).  Making use of the Genossenchaft theory of Otto 
Gierke, Sinzheimer challenged the “concession theory” of legal groups of German 
positive and Roman law.  Like Frederick Maitland, John Figgis, and Harold Laski in 
England, Sinzheimer argued that social groups are “organic entities, autonomously 
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capable of willing and acting rather than legally fictitious personalities as they were 
understood under Roman law.  These authentic group personalities make their own 
rules - - what Gierke called “social law.”  Collective bargaining agreements fit this 
new category.  Gierke‟s theory meant that labor unions as well as employer 
associations were legitimate groups with rights and duties.  These groups could speak 
through their own organs in ways determined by their own internal rules, that is, their 
own social law takes legal priority over the simple individual labor contract.  Beyond 
the inter-individual prerogative contract of laissez-faire liberalism, social law covers 
the collective constitutive contract based on multipartite consultations, bargaining and 
negotiation - - one which established a scheme of internal governance and 
autonomous moral/power resources, as well as a capacity for collective actions. 
 
This Weimar generated critical sociology of law tradition speaks to an American New 
Deal context wherein legislation like the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National 
Labor Relations Act, and the Social Security Act were written in the language of 
private law norms.  Such legislation was constituted in terms of a sense of 
entrepreneurial individuals‟ respective responsibilities, rather than in terms of the 
political economy of social citizenship connected to Continental European and 
Skandinavian welfare states.  
 
 A neglect of this key difference often blocks the English-speaking from 
understanding the sensibilities of European social democracy.  It is ironic that the 
perceived failures of New Deal generated social rights - - one tied to a private law 
welfare jurisprudence rather than to some sense of the governance of social law have 
been at the heart of the NeoLiberal assertion in the USA and Britain of market rights 
to choose, and the neoliberal emphasis on personal responsibility and initiative. 
 
II.  Understanding Regime Models Beyond the Interest Group Approach/  
      Relating Institutions to Normative Unfolding 
 
The past three decades have seen a de-socializing of governance--an increasing 
privatization of risk management and a dismantling of a pluralism reconceived as 
interest group liberalism in post-Neo Deal America or as a more encapsulated 
negotiated process of neocorporatism in Western Europe.  We move from a Social 
State (Sozialer Staat) of Keynsian welfare state insulated and exclusionary 
paternalism to a NeoLiberal Rechtsstaat and associated Civil society, where we are 
less a client and more an empowered customer/consumer--armed with powers of 
choice and contractualism--vis-à-vis health services education and training.  
“Enterprise yourself” is the NeoLiberal mentality and form of life--the internal 
normative logic of a new regime reasserting private law notions of entitlements.   
 
NeoLiberalism is a movement to actualize a utopia--the regime model of turn of the 
twentieth century neoclassical economics with its emphasis on markets.  It was a 
predominant regime model before the onslaught of social theory and its emphasis on 
social solidarism, social citizenship, social rights.  Also threatening was the emerging 
regime of social law with its challenge to the liberal notion of property, and its 
development of the negotiated collective bargaining contract beyond the individual 
prerogative contract. 
 
Generated out of a concern for improving a national economy‟s competitiveness and 
flexibility, NeoLiberalism emphasizes a strong focus on the short-term, and neglect of 
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longer term concerns.  There is an emphasis on discrete short term contracts rather 
than longer term relational contracts creating constellations of trust.
3
  Growing 
privatization of risk cuts into solidarism.  Market relations are imposed in spheres 
(universities, prisons, the caring professions) where classical and neoclassical liberal 
economics would not go.  Further the NeoLiberal utopia imposes a homogenizing 
effect on the plurality of institutional regimes it confronts.  All interactions are 
reduced to abstracted transaction cost economics.  In the effort to move flexibly gear 
the national economy competitiveness to the emergent globalized economic order.  
There is a movement from demand-side to supply-side concerns, from centralized 
neocorporatist bargaining regimes to a proliferation of decentered/decentralized 
bargaining subsystems.  Figure 1 can be reconfigured as Figure 2 below.  Here we 
can adapt one of the four-fold tables in Bo Rothstein‟s Just Institutions Matter 
(1997:201). 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
 
 
Regimes are purposefully created normative frameworks organizing negotiations 
among a formally specified set of actors - - an institutional setting within which 
negotiations can take place, and both bonding and blind force can be assured.  A 
regime offers 
 
                                               
3 See Oliver Williamson, The Economics of Capitalism: Firms,Markets, Relational Contracting (New 
York: The Free Press, 1985) which builds on the work of Ian Macneil, “Contracts: Adjustment of Long 
Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law,” Northwestern 
University Law Review 72 (1978): 854-905.  Williamson recognizes that between the neoclassical and 
relational contracting schemes, there is a shift of emphasis from the original agreements in the former 
to the entire relation as it evolves through time in the latter.  The relational nature of the “contracting” 
becomes more binding than the legal guarantee and enforcement mechanisms.  Relational contracts are 
the informal and unwritten agreements within and between firms.  These agreements as to vertical and 
horizontal integration are sustained by the value of future relationships and can be described in 
repeated game models.  They circumvent difficulties in the formal individuals-based pregotative 
contract.  Thus networks of relational contracting take into account an interactive normative order 
wherein mutually accepted interpretation emerges. 
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 a template of normative understandings 
 
 a specific mode of legal discourse corresponding to the logic of  
argumentative practices for fair negotiations based on discourse 
specific norms 
 
 a model of institutional justice; and 
 
 a utopian model for re-visioning practices.   
 
A regime is an ensemble of constitutive discourse providing the imaginary framework 
through which we interpret the symbolic order into which we are drawn, if not 
thrown.  It is a carrier of institutionalizing practices and governance rationales.  And, 
as an internal ensemble of discourse generating both legitimation and truth claims, it 
is open to interpellation/interrogation.  It has been the Right rather than the Left that 
has managed to articulate a rationality of governance consonant with a new regime of 
the self.  To a large extent, the regime of social democracy, while competing 
rationality with liberalism, is grounded in a liberal base.  
 
The interest group approach of comparative political sociology in the 1950s and 
1960s (David Truman, Gabriel Almond, Earl Latham, Reinhard Bendix, Lewis Coser, 
Ralf Dahrendorf) made no effort to examine either the objective material conditions 
or the already regulated or intersubjectively constituting normative conditions relating 
to the formation of interest groups themselves.  Stanley Rothman noted four decades 
ago (1960; 25) what we want to know, and where David Truman does not help us at 
all, is why the content of the political culture that these groups transmit assumes 
certain forms at certain times and not at others. 
 
The interest group approach was effectively challenged at the dawn of the 1970s by 
the social movement literature of Alain Touraine, Cornelius Castoriadis and Claus 
Offe - - specifically on the very process of interest group formation and the creation 
of new norms and values.  Institutions are understood as playing a mediating role as 
mechanisms for regulating conflict - - “mechanisms for arriving at decisions, the 
application of which is sanctioned by legitimate authority.” (Touraine, 1977:  178-79; 
cf Offe    : 54.)  This implies that there are operative norms prior to politics, learned 
legitimations - - so that “all claims are not negotiable” (Offe 1976 : 43).  Touraine 
(1977: 196) anticipates historical institutionalism by denoting how social action is 
circumscribed by a defined and particular historical context - - one that orients the 
field of social relations as well as the stakes in every kind of conflict or negotiation. 
 
The nature of path dependency is heavily influenced by the operative norms set by 
politically active members of the society - - i.e., an elite.  But Touraine and 
Castoriadis pointed to the differing and contradictory role expectations at work in any 
instituted configuration - - and that these differences and contradictions do not simply 
originate in the operative norms themselves.  Discursive traces of alternative 
institutionalizing practices are always at work.  And these, Touraine notes (362,311) 
“overflow the frame in which they appear” and “mobilize demands which cannot be 
entirely satisfied” within the interior arc of subject positions within a preconfigured 
regime and its frame of practical reasoning and learning. 
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Beyond Isaac Balbus‟s notion of latent groups and class determinism, there is another 
approaching and veering off from Truman.
4
  This is now less in terms of class 
determinism or epochal/regime periodization - - as in the Regulation Theory approach 
(Robert Boyer, Michel Aglietta, Alan Lipietz) - - and possibly more in terms of a 
transformative discursive modality detectable within the normative categorials of a 
predicate logic.  Beyond Truman‟s discussion of potential groups, we can focus on 
potential norms, emergent institutions. 
 
Beyond the 1970s turning to latent groups, social movements and structured 
inequality came respectively an institutionalist and a discursive turn, as political 
sociology focused more and more on normative commitment.  As Douglas North 
noted (1990) institutions were increasingly seen as the missing element in 
comprehending the normative framework of cooperative and competitive 
relationships.  
 
 For the “new institutionalism”of  DiMaggio and Powell (1991 :11), institutions were 
seen as establishing the very criteria by which people discover their preferences.  
Institutions were increasingly seen as constitutive of preference-formation, and not 
just as strategic environments within which actors pursue exogenously-given interests.  
Much of the new institutionalism was to become preoccupied with a cognitive 
bedrock of shared normative constructions - - templates and constructionism became 
the hegemonic buzzwords.  For a summary of the new institutionalisms, see Figure 3 
below. 
 
The turn toward normative commitment and normative regulation served to 
counteract the emphasis on interest aggregation; and - - as Joseph Heath in 
Communicative Action and Rational Choice (2001: 309) notes - - “to counteract the 
general tendency of human affairs to go very badly when left to self-interest.”  
Legitimation was understood in the communications theory of Habermas as the 
“warranted assertions of substantive rationality” eschewed by Weber‟s rationalization 
theory; and bracketed by Mannheim in Ideology and Utopia not as ideational 
constructions constitutive of knowledge, but as superstructural illusions materially 
produced and periodized.  Critical here is the constructionist reprise of the Sociology 
of Knowledge approach of Berger and Luckmann as well as of Mannheim.  
Habermas‟ ongoing project pushed us to recognize how we are socialized to develop a 
higher disposition in our practical reasoning, one that enable us to assign normative 
reasons priority over the institutional ones .  One that enables us to appreciate how we 
can distill underlying norms from the institutional context, from their experience as 
practices.  And in doing so, how to boil off the normative predicate logic of a 
substantive rationality.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 Isaac Balbus, “The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxist Analysis, Politics and Society, V.1 
(1972). 
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FIGURE 3 
 SI II/CI HI RCI 
Approach 
 
Cultural case study 
applying 
organizational theory; 
ethno methodology; 
the “new 
institutionalism” as 
“embeddedness” 
theory 
Immanent 
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We are unbracketing legitimation forms that Berger and Luckmann as well as 
Mannheim treat sociologically without considering their ontological and 
epistemological claims.  Legitimations,  represent the substance by which our 
preferences are ordered.  And Habermas‟s legitimation theory involves taking up 
“warranted assertions” with their “sense of appropriateness” and attendant 
constitutive “application discourse” - - all of which are ultimately testable in the 
“transcendent discourse” of universalizability/generalizability.  (See Klaus Gunther, 
1988).  
 
 Habermas‟ legitimation theory breaks as well with rational choice institutionalism 
(RCI) and its preference-hierarchy, transaction cost minimizing behavior and utility 
calculi - - which Hall and Soskice (2000) might yield too much ground to.  RCI starts 
with preferences that are exogenous to a model where all factors are held constant.  
Nothing is prior to individual utility calculi.  And institutions are understood as 
merely vehicles for respective utility maximizations.  RCI cannot account for the 
social, only what is at base intentional - - only what is  strategic pursuant to 
exogenously given interests.  Again, we return to the counterpoint - - the discursive 
approach to the substantive rationale of legitimating conduct, and its engagement of 
the instrumental rationale of strategy and preference.  Crucial is the former‟s focus on 
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an internalist conception of legitimation.
5
   The constellation of positions within a 
legitimating argument is internal to the argument itself.  It is an endogenous 
constellation of positions that a subject discursively takes in order to redeem 
normative commitments boiled-off in unbracketed form from their institutional 
husks.
6
   
 
The commitments - - i.e., justifications in discoursive theoretical terms - - make 
claims upon acting subjects.  They exist independently of the acting subjects.  Not just 
as a legacy or an institutional supply of justification, but as a trajectory with 
semblances and traces along an arc of subject positions.  This internalist trajectory is 
itself a contingent byproduct of accumulating social conflict and cooperation.  The 
trajectory and its arc - - which characterize the endogenous constellation of subject 
positions within normative argument - - moves us to an evaluation of possible 
normative alternatives. 
 
Thinking in terms of constellations, trajectories and arcs enable us to see how 
legitimating claims and strategies exist independently of actors and are drawn upon by 
actors.  As Andrew Sayer reminds us, “(T)he political discourse exists as it is 
regardless of whether I study it and whatever I think of it.”7  The dynamic of the 
constellation of discourse is something acting subjects internally (endogenously) 
participate in and constitute as they go along.  The constellation is constituted as we 
interrogate it.  Our contingent articulation involves less a functional playing of roles, 
and more of an authorial interpreting and infusing of roles with our instituting 
imaginary.
8
  The constellation comprises a predicate logic - - with warrant predicates 
and truth predicates; with assertoric claims and validity claims; and with application 
discourse and generalizability discourse.  (See Heath, 2001, and Gunther, 1988).  
Beyond Truman, the nature of our on-going willingness to “play by the rules” is 
subject to positioned criteria of warranted assertability.  These criteria, claims of 
rightness and their propositional content are reflexively reconstructable - - rationally 
reconstructable - - as Habermas labels this internal constellation of normative 
commitment and attendant argument.  They are rationally reconstructable as 
unfolding normativity.   
 
This is not just a bounded rationality of recombinatory elements, but an imaginative 
projecting of a growing rationality.
9
 This is an imaginative projecting and 
reconstructing that enables us to recognize the new - - that is, the “novel” - - within an 
institutional trajectory.  It is also an explaining of (1) either institutional stability; or 
(2) how ideas about institutional change or transformation fit into a hermeneutical 
                                               
5 Bernhard Peters, “On Reconstructive Legal and Political Theory” in Mathieu Deflem, ed. Habermas, 
Modernity and Law (London: Sage, 1996),: pp. 101-134. 
6 Ota Weinberger: “Habermas on Democracy and Justice: Limits of a sound conception,” Ratio Juris 
(1994), pp. 239-253; and Law, Institution and Legal Politics (Boston: Reidel, 1991).  See also Neil 
MacCormick and O. Weinberger, An Institutional Theory of Law (Boston: Reidel/Klawer, 1986). 
7 Andrew Sayer, Realism and Social Science.  (London: Sage, 2000) p. 34. 
8 See Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, trans. K. Blarney.  (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press 1987).  First published in France, 1975: cf. David Runciman.  Pluralism and the Personality 
of the State.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
9 Hans Joas: “On Articulation,” paper presented at the “Conference on Cornelius Castoriadis: 
Rethinking Autonomy” at Columbia University, 1 December 2000; The Genesis of Values.  (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000; and “Institutionalization as a Creative Process: The Sociological 
Importance of Cornelius Castoridias‟ Political Philosophy,” American Journal of Sociology.  94 
(1993), pp. 1184-1199. 
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circle of argumentation and interpretation - - an endogenous source of change within a 
constellation of discourse.  They do not merely fit within pre-existing institutions - - 
their tree-like roots, and their capillary growth of outcome paths.  “Ideas provide the 
point of mediation between actors and their environment.”10  (Hay 2001: Chapter 5).  
The subject actors‟ point of access to their densely structured context is irreducibly 
ideational - - and discursive.  
 
 Bob Jessop‟s “strategic-relational approach” (Jessop: 1997, 2000) melds well with 
path dependency HI.  Within a given specific context, there is an unevenly distributed 
configuration of opportunity and constraint for subject actors.  And along with it a 
structural “strategic selectivity,” that is, only certain specific paths of strategic action 
are available, and only some of these are likely to be actualized in actors‟ 
intentionality.  As in RCI, only some actors “read” the paths effectively - - but this is 
so as a result of there not being the perfect information assumption “all things being 
equal” in much neoclassical economics and rational choice theory.  Hay modifies 
Jessop, by stressing how actors without complete information need to interpret the 
world on the basis of a constellation of ideas in order to orient themselves 
strategically, to reflexively monitor both the context and consequences of their 
actions.  Thus there is as well a “discursive selectivity” derived not from material 
structure, but from the claims and frames yielded in an interrogation of the 
constellations of interpretation and argumentation that function as cognitive filters, 
embedded and growing within institutions - - that function as the language of a text, a 
narrative about structured material inequality, latent groups as well as normative 
commitment.  The claims and frames are yielded in the strategies which subject actors 
devise as a means to:  (1) realize their intentions upon a material context which favors 
(“selects”) certain strategies; and (2) accommodate their normative commitments in 
so doing.  This is not idealism, but an ideational accessing with both the material and 
normative context.  This is not the longings of desire or the imposition of cognition; 
rather, it is an engaging of the discursive with the material environment, not a 
dissolving. 
 
This is a relating of a theory of institutions to a theory of normative unfolding.  This is 
as a substantive theory and not merely a proceduralist formalism, not as an essentialist 
mythic/mystic narrative of some inherent national ordering.  Two decades of 
sympathetic critics - - such as  Klaus Hartmann, Ota Weinberger and Ottfried  
Hoffe -  - have urged Habermas to grasp the need for a theory of institutions which he 
could ground his discourse theory in - - as a theory of Institutional Normativism (IN). 
 
III.  Critical Theory as Critical Institutionalism 
 
What historical institutional (HI) finds in the institutional trajectory of unfolding 
normativity and its arc of subject positions is not idealism but discursive selectivity - - 
one which remains in dialectical tension with the exogenous structural selectivity of 
material incentive and opportunity structures.  This results in a constant dialogic 
tension confronting the discursive theoretical terms of an HI modified by 
communications theory into a theory of legitimation we will call Critical 
Institutionalism (CI).  This is a dialogic tension with the strategic opportunism 
inherent in RCI and evolutionary institutional economics.  Habermas helps HI with its 
persistent troubles with ideas, the constellation of legitimating, and normative 
                                               
10 Colin Hay, Political Analysis (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), Chapter 5.  
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commitment.  On the other hand, HI poses a final “way out:” to Habermas‟s persistent 
and unnecessarily confining problem of equating strategy with ultimately utility-based 
technique and purely instrumental reasoning; and second to his separating the realm 
of normativity and law from institutional facts.  See Figure 4 below. 
 
HI has been open to acknowledging exposure ideas, but tends not to see ideas as 
normative contents within institutional practices.  Conceptualizing HI as a 
legitimation theory enables us to conceive of the ordering of preferences less 
structurally, and more endogenously within a constellation of discourse/argument--
where institutional commitments “ghost the future” in traces and semblances of the 
unborn, or not yet actualized. 
 
Institutions contain within them a normative core--a chain of practical reasoning/a 
constellation of action-related argumentation.  Jurgen Habermas offers HI procedural 
normative models by which the cognitive (i.e., validity) claims within such 
argumentation can be made meaningful--in terms of the legitimation they immanently 
project.  Neil MacCormick and Ota Weinberger sympathetically modify Habermas.  
They refer to two modification as Institutional Normativism (IN), ideas are not to be 
bracketed, but are to be subject to reflexive reconstruction as a form of discourse 
(practical reasoning) so that normative potentialities made available by collective 
learning processes are scanned for realizability. 
 
In contrast to either the “brute facticity” of empiricism or the counterfactual chimera 
of procedural normativisism, (IN) focuses on normative contents within institutional 
or institutionalizing practices, “institutional facticity”--i.e., the nature of our 
participation in the promising game and obligation game inherent in legitimation.  
Ideational structures that are the byproduct of the rearticulation of bargaining power 
within conflict become institutionalized and normalized as “facts,” and their 
warranted assertions as “immanent forms.” IN is rationally reconstructive of the 
institutionalizing “warranted assertions” involved in our participation within 
emergent forms of life. 
 
“Critical Theory redeems past hope in the name of the future by revealing the as yet 
unrealized potentials of the present.”11  It asks to what extent sedimented and floating 
signifiers have not yet delivered on their promise of a substantive order.  Unlike the 
Sociology of Knowledge of Karl Mannheim or Berger and Luckmann, critical theory 
does not deny the immanent development and affirmation of changed and new forms - 
- changed and new conceptual mediations of social reality - -- as a process of 
knowledge driven by an inner dialectic, as an unfolding of categorial analysis whose 
immanent predicate logic provides the basis for critique. 
 
Critical Theory is a theory of legitimation as rational aspiration.  It uncovers and 
measures its utopian content - - the substance of the organizing principles embedded 
within its worldview (Weltanschaung), its mental model.  Critical Theory tests the 
warranted assertions and truth claims of legitimations inherent within an institutional 
legacy, an institutional trajectory, and the arc of an institution‟s anticipated horizon 
(or constellation).  It is a form of self-reflective knowledge in itself.
12
     
                                               
11 Seyla Benhabib, “Modernity and the Aporias of Critical Theory,” Telos, n.49 (1981), pp. 58-59. 
12 Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).  Pp. 
59, 88, 95. 
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A theory of legitimation is grounded in actors‟ valuation of what is right.  And the 
more ideational institutionalism we have posed reflects the tradition of 
institutionalism as institutional embodiment of normative substance, rather than the 
tradition of evolutionary institutional economics.  It is legitimated intersubjectivity as 
a substance with its own internal principles - - its own entelechies.  (See Massimo 
LaTorre, 1999). 
Historical institutionalism (HI) conceptualized as a theory of legitimation can account 
for this ideational foundation of institutions.
13
  Part of the gap in HI results from the 
fact that practicing political sociologists - - often by training - - skeptical or dismissive 
of the possibility of any rational grounding for unfolding normativity. 
 
A substantive understanding of institutionalism is one that fills gaps, aporias (in both 
Derrida‟s and Benhabib‟s terms), and situations of undecidability with semblances 
(Adorno), iterable traces or spectral presences (Derrida).  And a Critical 
Institutionalism (CI) resulting from the grounding of Habermas‟s brand of critical 
theory as discourse theory in a theory of institutional facts resists the gapless 
normativism of a Kelsen or a Langdell, it as well resists the equally positivist 
imprinting of the black letter law without recourse to Natural Law.  And for that 
matter, Habermas‟s surrogate for Natural Law--a proceduralist transcendental 
formalism known as the Theory of Communicative Competence with its test n the 
court of the Ideal Speech Situation.  Note Figure 4 below.    
 
 
FIGURE 4 
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In confronting the NeoLiberal challenge to all forms of sociality/solidarity, such a 
critical institutionalism would follow the jurisprudence of Richard Fallon in probing 
the inherent intelligibility within the fluidity of constructivist norm creation beyond 
the narrower interpretive mode of Richard Epstein and Antonin Scalia.  Substantive 
                                               
13 Thelen 
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design by constituting interpretive communities displaces individualist formalized 
law. 
 
The CI developed here evaluates the forms by which societies evaluate themselves, 
that is, the formal ordering of what Ottfried Hoffe has referred to as “Institutional 
Justice.”  Hoffe understands a juridico-discursive--like Bo Rothstein--order in the 
“discourse theoretical terms” of argumentative forms, rather than in an engagement 
with chimerical counterfactuals.  These argumentative forms serve as the vehicles by 
which we extend the institutionalizing dialogue of deliberative justification into the 
marketplace and civil law as governmentality - - governance rationales used in 
practices, rather than idealizations (chimera).  This involves discourses answering 
practical questions--and with it a discursive selectivity testing for the dialogic claims 
of an unredeemed predicate logic, beyond the functional sociological compliance and 
justification of a strategic selectivity. 
 
Critical institutionalism as a capstone to historical institutionalism (HI) can be 
understood as an internalist principled game, a language game 
 
 wherein norms rather than some mythic/mystic substance is experienced as 
inner institutional morality (Hermann Heller), 
 
 wherein deliberation defines its own guiding norms and practices as an 
institutionalizing governance rationale (Jurgen Habermas), 
 
 wherein norms are not understood as objects of pure cognition, but as 
values we commit ourselves to in our practices:  (Georges Gurvitch); and 
 
 wherein norms emerge as the socially shared solutions to problems and as 
byproducts of repeated social conflicts - - from which they are transformed  
into a constellation of learned normative commitments, revealed as 
promises.
14
 
 
Here the “institutional” represents the non-contractual dimension of obligation - - the 
shared standards of self-governance, and valuation, the normative commitments and 
promises of a “promising game constituted in and through discourse theoretical 
terms.
15
 
 
Criticial institutionalism like the “critical history” posed by Michel Foucault and 
Mitchell Dean goes beyond posing critical junctures of contingent emergence.
16
 It 
involves a capacity to engage in interrogation of the internalist principled/promising 
game - - wherein discourse is ontologically prior to identity-formation, and legitimacy 
is prior to legality.  “No individual can choose to stand outside the totality of the 
interpretive frameworks of discourse written into our very human condition.”17   
Institutional Justice involves the legitimated ordering of regimes  - - substantively and 
procedurally - - in terms of formal models of law and political economy. 
                                               
14 Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict.  (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
15 John Searle:  The Construction of Social Reality.  (New York: The Free Press, 1995); Speech Acts 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 1969). 
16 Mitchell Dean, Governmentality (London: Sage, 1999). 
17 A.M. Smith, Laclau and Mouffe; The Radical Democratic Imaginary (London: Routledge, 1998). 
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Subject positions - - themselves constituted discursively - - are an ensemble of 
interpretative schema responsive to structural positions.
18
  They are drawn upon as 
legitimating strategies and mark how we experience our structural position within the 
social.  ( Here see the development of this concept from Gramsci through Althusser 
through Laclau and Mouffe.
19
)  Thus we are not just bearers of supports, but actors 
who draw upon a repertoire of discourse resources - - within a discursive structure of 
signifiers - - interpretive schema, rights, claims and collective identities tied to subject 
positions.  We are actors who draw on legitimations of purposive and substantive 
argumentation. 
 
Subject position within respective regimes of law and political economy can be 
rationally reconstructed in discourse.  In doing so the internal relations of an 
immanent normative unfolding or a projected re-institutionalizing of practices can be 
gauged - - in the discourse theoretical terms of argumentative forms, i.e., discursive 
selectivity.  Subject positions are more in a condition of floating signifiers that have 
not yet delivered on its promises, on its normative commitments, on its reflected 
visions.  And moving along the interior arc of a regime‟s subject positions, we move 
beyond the configurative paths, junctures and practices of “effective history” 
practiced by HI, toward a “critical history” associated with CI.  The latter employs 
more of a diremptive approach - - a key phrase from Habermas and ironically Georges 
Sorel before him.  The diremptive approach attempts to reflect reality at more than 
one moment, one instance. 
 
Legitimations are positioned in narratives and worldviews/world picture - - not as 
static snapshots, but as panning shots of a regime in motion - - with social movement, 
swelling beyond thresholds, and institutional emergence.  A diremptive approach 
scans a constellation of instances that open up to montage-like presentation 
 
 where genres return to haunt us not just as memory, but also as 
possibility of uncanny actualization; and 
 
 wherein the future is never either fully determinable or fathomable, but 
only grasped and recognized as traces or semblances - - moved by the 
necessity of truth, rather than the arbitrariness of ideology -  -within 
the gaps among the intermittent rhythms, sequences and jumpcuts. 
Critical instiutionalism (CI) complements historical institutionalism by keeping us 
aware that the swelling of historical movement and change is an instance of 
displacement, as much as it is path-dependent.  This is the displacement of one 
threshold for another.  History, Walter Benjamin advised us, is never wrapped into a 
specific moment of a fixed juncture.  Rather, it flows in a passage that swells beyond 
the limits of its epoch, of its period.  It confronts a gap - - or aporia - - and makes up 
for it by constituting a canal for the displacement of the swelling (schwelle), a 
superimposition of a threshold.
20
 
                                               
18 See Jacob Torfing, New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek (London: Basil Blackwell, 
1999). 
19 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, “Post-Marxism without Apologies,” in E. Laclau, New 
Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (London: Verso, 1990). 
20 Howard Eiland.  “Reception in Distraction,” paper presented at the “Benjamin Now Symposium: 
Critical Encounters with Walter Benjamin‟s Arcades Project” at the Forbes Center for Research in 
Culture and Media Studies, Brown University, 6 April 2001. 
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IV.   The Argumentative Turn:  Categorically Grasping the Signifiers within         
Pluralist Social Subjects of Rights 
 
The promise of the signifiers of the Governance of Social Law have only partially 
delivered in their promise of a new institutional order.  As Adorno notes, the 
democratic imaginary seeks traces of a prospect of utopia within a society that 
continually betrays it, tracing its own claims which ghost the future. 
 
To what extent can liberalism offer a convincing account of the democratic 
citizenship adaptable to the provocation of non-statist institutions?  Following Laski 
rather than Schmitt, sovereignty in the past century reflects social compacts rather 
than separate state apparatuses per se.  A regime of the Autonomous Social uncoupled 
from the State and linked through complementary institutions within civil society is 
bent on institutionalizing itself as a form of life, as a postliberal governance rationale. 
 
Following Laski rather than Schmitt,we need to accommodate rather than exorcise a 
pluralism of heteronomous regulatives and constitutives.  Out of the accelerating 
pluralism of the past century, emerges a plan of signifiers in the practical and 
discursive struggles of pluralist Social Subjects of Rights rather than the Marxist 
monist Social Subject of Rights - - another sense of sovereignty eclipsed.
21
  The 
Governance of Autonomous Social Law derives from deliberation as an effect - - as a 
discourse finds its own subjects.  Such pluralist deliberation is the source of its 
legitimation, rather than some higher law or some gapless system of norms.  This 
trace of a tradition of discourse associated with an emergent practice and juridification 
draws on the categorical framing of a democratic imaginary in its historical struggles 
and in its immanent potential.   
 
The practices and forms of the Governance of Social Law can be grasped 
categorically as assertional commitments (Brandom), and not counterfactually as 
chimera (G.A. Kelly).  Chimera are anti-historical.  The issue of immanent historical 
warrants - - rather than visions of order - - are immanent within the core of practices, 
immanent within a regime of discourse whose claims are interrogated/interpellated.  
This immanence is inherent in what George Hendrik von Wright
22
 would call a quasi-
teleology of normic statements - - that is, legitimating, propositional claims.  A 
Critical Institutionalism (CI) goes beyond the Sociology of Knowledge in 
unbracketing normative commitments from practices, from their institutional husks. 
 
Categorial form is created in historical time but attains independent validity as the 
argument behind an institutionalizing practice is interpellated and gauged.  Beyond 
the Sociology of Knowledge, Institutional Normativism (IN) starts with a 
genealogical study of the evolution of institutional practices as reworkable traces of 
affirmative substance, the substance of an emergent form of legitimation.  Then IN is 
transformed into CI in its interpellation of the legitimating argument itself, which 
guides the “imaginary institution of society.” 
 
                                               
21 Kirsti McClure: “Taking Liberties in Foucault‟s Triangle: Sovereignty, Discipline, Governmentality 
and the Subject of Rights in Austin Sarat and T. Kearns, eds. Politics, Identities and Rights (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); and “On the Subject of Rights: Pluralism, Plurality and the 
Politics of Identity” in Chantal Mouffe, ed. Dimensions of Radical Democracy (London: Verso, 1996). 
22 Georg Hendrick Von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1971).  Pp. 58-60, 84-86. 
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Beyond HI, and its focus on path dependency, Critical Theory as CI and “critical 
history” understands a process of self-clarification and emergent possibility internal to 
a historical process, internal to the argument of normative principles that are the core 
of institutional/institutionalizing subjects.  Following the anthropologist Mary 
Douglas in How Institutions Think (1986), institutions can be conceptualized as 
subjects of action, as bearer of practices and their normative claims/commitments.  A 
Critical Institutionalism looks beyond the “discursive selectivity” of some logic of 
appropriateness and the interestedness of actors‟ application of that logic, what 
Schattschneider once called the “mobilization of bias.”  CI looks beyond 
“interestedness” toward “commitedness.”  In this way CI may have more in common 
with Philip Selznick‟s “old institutionalism” with its focus on the affirmativity of 
institutional commitments as an ontology of institutional facts, rather than the focus of 
RCI on “contracting.” 
 
Beyond interestedness and discursive selectivity, we are moved to focus on discursive 
commitment itself rather than merely the application of the commitment.  We are 
moved to a theory of legitimation rather than of interest groups, to a commitedness to 
rights and procedures. 
 
Rational Reconstruction can be understood externally/explicitly as the process tracing 
of the contingent interaction, the discursive selectivity of policy-makers‟ performance 
and claims within a path dependent institutional context. 
 
Rational Reconstruction can also be understood as a more internalist/implicit 
interpellation of the commitments themselves:  their warrants, their propositions, the 
arguments immanent within path shaping/institutionalizing practice “boiled off from 
their institutional husks.” 
 
Figure 5 below, describes the dialectical relationship between the explicit 
performative practices and norms and the more depth-level implicit values and 
warranted assertions.  Rational reconstruction is more than retrieval--it is the 
reconstruction of a set of practices we have come to learn, and the underlying values 
by which legitimation claims are evalualed. 
 
Social Subjects of Rights are inscribed in material practice - - not as a system of ideas 
in people‟s heads, but as material practices existing in people‟s conduct according to 
their commitments.  These material practices can be understood not only in terms of 
an ordinary causal emergence reducible to micro-properties, and path dependency 
within predetermined paths of appropriateness.  These practices can also be 
conceptualized in terms of a novel path-shaping and holistic emergency wherein a set 
of properties (such as the Governance of Social Law) may be determined by and 
dependent on other properties, but not reducible to those others.
23
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
23 See William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 171-78; and 
Jagwon Kim, Supervenience and Mind Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1993). Cf. Joas Supra. 
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FIGURE 5 
 
5A. The EXPLICIT/External  (realm of contingency) 
 
 empirico – sociological level of practical reasoning 
 assertion as action/conduct 
 performative derived from interestedness 
 action – related argumentation 
 
o regimes of argumentative practices having “discursive 
selectivity” 
o the arguments of policy makers 
o the coherence of a policy program as carried out by elite actors 
 
 External Rational Reconstruction 
     as a process-tracing of the contingent interaction within a path 
                           dependent institutional context 
 
 
____________________ mediated by an internal dialectic ____________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
5B. The IMPLICIT/internal  (realm of necessity) 
 
 Grammatological, juridico-discursive order with “internal 
relations” 
 Assertion as normativity 
 Epistemological claim/warranted assertion derived from 
committedness (“self-referring”) 
 
o the argument itself: commitments as normative core 
o interpellation of propositions 
o resonance with value form categorials 
o immanent with legitimation arguments 
 
 Rational Reconstraction of the Internal Relations of the immanent 
and emergent normativity “boiled off from its institutional husk” as an 
“arc of subject positions” within an immanent rationale. 
 
Following Campbell and Pedersen
24
, CI can be seen as a strand of discursive 
institutinalism (DI).  By DI, Campbell and Pedersen denote what we called IN, 
institutional normativism (IN).  DI focuses on perceptions and meanings in “discourse 
                                               
24 J. L. Campbell and Ove Pedersen: “Introduction: The Rise of NeoLiberalism and Institutional 
Analysis;” and “The Second Movement in Institutional Analysis‟ in J. L. Campbell and Ove Pedersen, 
eds. TheRise of NeoLiberalism and Institutional Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001). 
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theoretical terms” (dtt‟s), but not in terms of apriori categorials of legitimation that 
precede cultural perceptions and legal meanings.  DI’s principal concern is to trace 
the process by which an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations are 
translated into institutional patterns--how we are discursively structured, and the ways 
in which policy debate is conducted. 
 
Kjaer 
25
 understands DI as the relationship between discourse and institution as the 
outcome of historically specified ways of situating and organizing practices in a 
society with horizons of meaning.  Hay (2001) defines a strand of DI as the 
“ideational institutionalist approach” (II) as a process-tracing of the way people 
position one another through the use of a widely employed discourse; as a sociology 
of practical knowledge detailing the application of dominant ideas/legitimations by 
policy-makers.
26
 
 
DI involves “normic statements.”27  This is the level of theory “which leaves open the 
question whether people are doing what people invariably do in those uniquely 
complicated circumstances or are doing one of the comparatively few things which 
people…choose to do in such circumstances.” 
 
The II strand of DI/IN focuses on performatives of learning and problem-solving--
practical judgments wherein intuitions, understandings, commitments and pragmatic 
actions align and combine.  In so doing, II details a regime of propositionally 
differentiated speech acts, emerging out of institutional facticity.  And it identifies the 
compelling reasons for what we say or do in concrete situations. 
 
Beyond policy-makers‟ application of ideas, CI is the strand of DI/IN that turns to the 
ideas themselves, and to the argumentative logic of a legitimation.  It also turns to the 
experience of that argumentative logic.  This is what is referred to in policy analysis 
as “the argumentative turn.” 28  This “argumentative turn” opens up the commitments 
implicit in the decision-making of governance, and captures the endogenous 
emergence of argumentative logic that breaks with hegemonic patterns of legitimizing 
thinking associated with a regime. 
 
Argumentative propositions are defined which problematize hegemonic normative 
statements--which counter justifying assertions of regime leaders.  Thus, CI can 
elucidate ideas and actions which are not readily predicted by the rational 
reconstruction of interest-based behavior--and which do not necessarily follow from 
historical path dependencies.  Rather, these ideas and actions may resonate with either 
forgotten long standing values, like those of reflexive labor law and the governance of 
social law--or with newly emerging values. 
 
                                               
25 Peter Kjaer and Ove Pedersen.  “Translating Liberalization: NeoLiberalism in the Danish Negotiated 
economy” in Campbell and Pedesen, pp. 219-218. 
26 Hay, Political Analysis, 1981. 
27 Hugh Stretton.  The Politivcal Sciences (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 327. 
28 Note here Frank Fischer and John Forester, eds. The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and 
Planning.  Durham: Duke University Press, 1983.  Giandomenico Majone.  Evidence, Argument and 
Persuasion in the Policy Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).  Maarten Hajer, The 
Politics of Environmental Discourse Oxford Clarendon Press, 1995); Martin Hajer and Hendrik 
Wagenaar, eds., Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Networked Society 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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The “argumentative turn” is influenced by the poststructural focus on the practices in 
which humans engage--not the humans themselves, nor the structures by which they 
are constrained.  Such focus centers on the way arguments are made--within a 
discursive ensemble--and can be read as a “text.”  How does a group of people 
creatively bring a “self-referential” model of practices into existence, how they think 
about, how they talk about it, how they transubstantiate it, maintain and reform it.
29
  
 
The argumentative turn follows the discursive turn in developing the study of 
institutional normativism beyond a sociology of practical knowledge of iterated 
games described by Gicondomenico Majone (1989). 
 
  Geoffrey Hawthorn
30
 noted that Karl Mannheim‟s sociology of knowledge “never 
approach[ed] a resolution to the very difficult question of the relation between “the 
internal and external interpretations of ideas.”  CI extends the critical theory of 
Habermas to a focus on the internal relations of argument, and beyond the external 
relationism of applied practical knowledge that characterizes II.  Whereas HI’s focus 
is causality and capacity, II’s focus is how ideas are constituted (constructed) and 
framed.  CI’s internalism transcends historicism and sociology with a focus on 
principles and the immanence of their argument.  HI and II operate on the level of 
institutional facticity, whereas CI operates on the level of principles, value-form 
categorials that historicism and sociology bracket out. 
 
The autonomies of relational contracting and private law regimes reflect the pluralism 
of instituted associations and instituting associations that motivated Maitland, Laski, 
Heller and Neuman to understand that pluralism as the central of post-liberal contract 
law and labor law as well as political theory.  Twentieth century contract law and 
labor law sought to institutionalize social reflection and regulation of enduring class 
conflict, group conflict and corporate conflict.   
 
Social rights and social law can be understood in terms of the “polycontextuality” of 
autonomous non-staff regimes legislating, regulating and adjudicating within their 
own subsystems; as well as in relating to each other.  Such as approach studies the 
contextual space between such regimes as a space for the collision of discourses, 
language games, textualities and projects. 
 
Within this hierarchy of these subsystems, contract appears no longer as merely an 
economic exchange between respective individual persons, but as a space for finding 
differently contracting discursive projects with emerging discursive rights--i.e., rights 
to interpret competing claims.  Networks of relational contracting sustained by the 
value of future relationships take into account an autonomous interactive normative 
order wherein mutually accepted interpretation emerges.  Each network has its own 
autonomous path dependent institutional trajectories.   
 
Institutions matter.  And institutionalisms matter.  And further to follow Bo Rothstein, 
just institutions matter.  Critical institutionalism (C1) focuses on the claims of justice 
inherent in institutional/institutionalizing practices.  Out of the immanent tradition of 
                                               
29 Barry Barnes “Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction,” Sociology, v.4 (1983), pp. 524-545; and 
David Bloor, Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions (London Routeldge, 1997). 
30 Geoffrey Hawthorn.  Enlightenment and Dispair: a History of Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976), p. 181. 
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social law and social rights such a critical institutionalism can be understood and 
made explicit, as we comprehend implicit normative commitments.   
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